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ABSTRACT 
Transparent Optical Networks (TONs) can communicate large amount of data at a high 
speed among nodes of the network. So, any type of failure whether caused by component 
failure or caused by an attack can cause a significant loss of data. In case of faults, the 
network can restore its functionality, by identifying the malfunctioning component of the 
network and solving the problem. This is not the case with a deliberate, malicious attack. 
That is why security and attack management is becoming a very important issue in WDM 
networks. 
In the previous years, a number of researchers worked on solving the attack problem. One 
common approach is to plan the network in a way that minimizes the influence of an 
attack, by using appropriate routing and wavelength assignment (RWA) strategies. Most 
of the research in this area focuses on the static traffic model, where the set of traffic 
demands is known in advance. In this thesis, we propose a new security-aware RWA 
technique for dynamic traffic, using dedicated path protection. The goal is to improve the 
performance of WDM networks by accommodating more traffic demands, while reducing 
the probability of disruption due to malicious attacks. 
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1.Introduction 
 
 Optical network is a group of two or more computing devices linked via optical 
fibers in order to share resources, exchange files, or allow electronic communications. 
The main reason to use optical networks is that they can transfer a huge amount of data at 
a very high speed over wide areas.  
 
Figure ‎1-1 illustrates a 5 node networks 
1.1 Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) 
 An optical fiber can handle a very large amount of data, around 50 terabits per 
second. In the first generation of the optical networks, the huge capacity of the optical 
fiber (bandwidth) was used by only one user.  None of the existing electronic devices, 
that can be connected to an optical network, can transmit or receive data at such a high 
speed. A certain method called Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) is used in 
order to benefit as much as possible of the capacity of the optical fiber.  
 In WDM networks, the bandwidth is divided into non-overlapping ranges of 
frequencies, called channels, where each channel corresponds to a different carrier 
wavelength and is capable of transmitting data independently of the other channels. 
 The Wavelength Division Multiplexing method combine the data from different 
devices using different wavelengths and transmit them over one optical fiber and at the 
1 
Node 
Fiber 
1 2 
3 4 
5 
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receiving end the Wavelength Division Multiplexing method split the signals and 
distribute them to their appropriate destinations. WDM networks use switches in order to 
manage how different signals are directed to their corresponding destinations. 
 As an optical signal propagates along optical fibers, the quality of the signal, in 
terms of amplitude, bit error rate, shape and phase degrades. Amplifiers are used in 
optical networks in order to overcome this limitation. 
1.2 Routing And Wavelength Assignment (RWA) 
 A lightpath allows two nodes to communicate in the optical domain. A lightpath 
traverses multiple fibre links in order to allow the communication between the source and 
destination nodes. Each lightpath is specified by a route and a carrier wavelength. The 
Routing And Wavelength Assignment (RWA) problem is act of choosing a route and 
assigning a wavelength to lightpaths while respecting that each lightpath should use its 
assigned wavelength over all its route (continuity constraint), and if two lightpaths are 
sharing a link they should use two different wavelengths (clash constraint). 
 The following figure shows two lightpaths using two links each, one from node 1 
to node 4 (using carrier wavelength and another lightpath from node 1 to node 3 
(using carrier wavelength ). Figure 1.2 illustrates how lightpaths respect the continuity 
and clash constraints. 
 
Figure ‎1-2 Continuity and Clash Constraints. 
1 
2 
3 
4 



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1.3 Attacks 
 While the data travels through the optical network as light signals, it is vulnerable 
to some physical impairments other then the degradation of the signal while propagating 
long distance. Physical layer impairments can be classified into linear and nonlinear 
effects. Regardless of the signal power, linear impairments affect the wavelengths 
(channels) individually, while nonlinear impairments cause disturbance and interference 
between the optical channels. Those external impairments can occur either when two or 
more lightpaths use same wavelength and share a common node (in-band) or if they use 
different wavelength but share a common link (out-of-band).  
 One of the characteristics of an optical amplifier is the gain competition. The 
amplifier has a limited number of upper-state photons used for signal amplification. 
These photons are distributed among the incoming signals proportionally to their powers. 
If the power of one of the signals exceeds a certain level (20 db above normal), it may 
influence the power to amplify the other signals and it may leak into other signals with 
lower power, which can influence the performance of the network. Malicious users can 
benefit from this case by injecting a high power signal on a legitimate signal and attack 
other signals in the network. 
1.4 Attack-Aware RWA 
 In order to prevent the previously mentioned type of attacks, attack-aware RWA 
should be used.  In attack-aware RWA two approaches can be used. The first approach is 
to design the network and route the lightpaths in a way to minimize the number of 
lightpaths that can be attacked simultaneously. The second approach is the path protection 
that has two types:  
 Shared path protection, where shared backup resources are used whenever an 
attack occurs. 
 Dedicated path protection, where a backup lightpath is assigned for each working 
lightpath. If the working lightpath is being attacked at a certain node or at a certain link 
then the data transmitted over that path will not reach its destination in a proper way. 
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Therefore, there is a need for a parallel path (backup lightpath) that does not share any 
node or any link with the working lightpath to be used in order to prevent the attacked 
part of the working lightpath. The backup lightpath is used when the working lightpath is 
under attack. This is the approach that we are going to use in our research because the 
dedicated path protection model is easier to implement and test and I left the shared path 
protection for future work. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates a sample connection in the dedicated path protection approaches 
 
Figure ‎1-3 dedicated path protection 
 
 The primary and backup lightpaths of one connection must not share a common 
link or a common intermediate node to prevent simultaneous attack which leads to the 
lost of transmitted data over that connection. 
 Most work on security-aware RWA in WDM network considers the static traffic 
case, where all the lightpaths that are to be set up in the network are known beforehand. 
In the case of dynamic traffic, where lightpath requests arrive one by one in response to 
user requests, link failures were handled using path protection. 
S D 
Primary 
Backup 
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1.5 Solution Approach 
 In my thesis, I am going to study the attack-aware routing and wavelength 
assignment for dynamic traffic in WDM networks using the dedicated path protection 
approach. I believe that considering that an attacking signal on a certain channel can only 
influence certain adjacent channels will have a significant impact on the performance and 
cost of a network. I am going to study the blocking probability of a WDM network using 
my approach and compare it with the approach used in [5] and the approach that does not 
use any attack-aware model. 
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 2 contains a detailed review of the fundamental concepts of WDM optical 
networks and other related topics on RWA. A review of the previous works on attack-
aware in optical networks, is also presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes different 
security models and also the implementation of our algorithm. The results of the tests that 
we ran is found in chapter 4. And finally the conclusion is in chapter 5. 
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2 Background Review 
2.1 Optical Networks: 
 Communication networks consists of two or more computing devices linked via a 
form of communication medium, in order to share resources, exchange files, or allow 
electronic communications [12]. The medium may be wired e.g. coaxial cable, optical 
fiber, twisted pair cables, or wireless e.g. radio, micro, infrared waves.  
 An optical network is a communication network that uses fiber optic cables as the 
main communication medium to convert and transmit data as light pulses between sender 
(source) and receiver (destination) nodes [13]. Optical networks allow fast and reliable 
communication, with very low loss of signal over long distances, and the capacity to 
transmit at very high data rates (bandwidth) [14],[15] .  
2.2 Optical Fiber: 
 An optical fiber is a thin strand of glass that acts like a pipe for light over long 
distances. It is used as a medium to transmit light from one end to the other end of the 
fiber. Fig. 2.1 shows the cross-section of an optical fiber consisting of a core, which 
carries the actual light, surrounded by cladding, a layer of glass with lower refractive 
index than the core, a buffer coating and a jacket which act as two protective layers [16]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-1 Single mode fiber [17] 
 The cladding has a lower refractive index than the core; this allows the signal to 
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propagate inside the core based on the phenomenon of total internal reflection [18]. If the 
angle of incidence at the boundary of the two materials is greater than a certain angle 
called critical angle [18], the wave cannot pass through and is entirely reflected (totally 
internally reflected). 
 The critical angle is measured with respect to the perpendicular line to the 
refractive boundary; it is the incident angle when the refracted light is parallel to the 
boundary at the incidence point (no signal is defused to the cladding). The light will be 
totally internally reflected if the incident angle is greater than the critical angle. Figure 
2.2 illustrates the principle of refraction and total internal reflection. 
 
Figure ‎2-2 Example of total internal reflection [18] 
 
 There are two major types of fiber optic cables: single mode cable and multimode 
cable.  
Single mode fiber: 
 Single mode cable is a single strand of glass fiber with a diameter of 8.3 to 10 
microns. It carries higher bandwidth than multimode fiber [19]. Single mode fiber is used 
in many applications, where data is sent using multiple frequencies with same mode so 
only one cable is needed [19]. In single-mode fiber we can have waves of light with 
different frequencies but of the same mode. Single mode fiber has a higher transmission 
rate and up to 50 times more distance than multimode, but it also costs more. Single-
mode fiber has a much smaller core than multimode. The small core and single 
(propagation mode) ray of light eliminates any distortion (signal degradation caused by 
light propagation of different frequencies at different speeds) that could result from 
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overlapping light pulses, and provides the least signal attenuation (loss of signal 
intensity). Most WDM networks use single-mode optical fibers. 
Multimode fiber: 
 Multimode cable has a little bit bigger diameter, with a common diameters in the 
50-to-100 micron range, it gives high bandwidth at high speeds over medium distances, 
such as within a building or on a campus. Typical multimode links have data rates of 10 
Mbit/s to 10 Gbit/s over link lengths of up to 600 meters (2000 feet) [20]. Designers now 
use single mode fiber in new applications using Gigabit and beyond because multiple 
paths of light can cause signal distortion at the receiving end, resulting in an unclear and 
incomplete data transmission in long cables. Figure 2.3 represents a model of simple fiber 
optic data link [21], including a Source-User pair, Transmitter and Receiver with their 
connectors. 
 
Figure ‎2-3 Example of simple fiber optic data link 
2.3 Optical Network Components 
2.3.1 Transmitter: 
 The transmitter in a fiber optic data link gets the data from the source as digital 
electrical signal, then emits and modulates a light coupled into the optical fiber cable in 
order to represent the received digital data [21]. The main component of a transmitter is a 
laser diode (LD) that can be modulated at a very high speed and produces a coherent high 
power light that can be coupled efficiently to the fiber optic cable.  
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2.3.2 Receiver: 
 Fiber optic cable provides the data to the receiver as an optical signal. The 
receiver then translates it to its best estimates of the binary data. It then provides this data 
to the user in the form of an electrical signal. The main component of a receiver is a 
photodiode. The photodiode senses the light output of the fiber optic cable which is 
detected and then converted to an electrical signal. The demodulation decision process is 
carried out on the resulting electrical signal to identify the digital data it represents [21]. 
2.3.3 Connectors: 
 The connector is a mechanical device mounted on the end of a fiber optic cable, 
transmitter or receiver to direct and collect light. It allows it to be matched to a similar 
device. The Transmitter provides the information light to the fiber optic cable through a 
connector. The Receiver gets the information light from the fiber optic cable through a 
connector. [10]. 
2.4  Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) 
The bandwidth that optical fiber cable provides is much more than the bandwidth 
required by a single source-user pair, which leads to a great waste of the optical fibre 
capacity. The solution of this problem is to make multiple source-user pairs share the 
huge bandwidth of the same fiber. The technique that allows this sharing of optical fibre 
bandwidth is known as multiplexing [11]. At the source side, there is a multiplexer that 
combines the different signals and sends them over the optical fiber cable. At the user 
side, there is a demultiplexer that separates the combined stream and directs each of these 
signals to the corresponding User. 
Figure 2.4 gives simple illustration of multiplexing and demultiplexing [22]: 
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Figure ‎2-4 Example of multiplexing 
 
 Wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) is a technique that increases the 
utilization of the capacity of optical fiber link by combining, transmitting, and separating 
data into several channels [22]. The data stream from each source is assigned an optical 
wavelength. The multiplexer then couples all of optical signals generated for all sources 
into the fiber optic cable. These different wavelength optical signals propagate 
simultaneously. Since our focus in this thesis is on WDM, we will explain it in more 
details in the coming section.  
 A single mode optical fiber cable has a very low loss transmission with an 
enormous bandwidth (tens of terahertz) that no existing opto-elctronic sender or receiver 
device can handle. Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) addresses these problems 
by dividing the bandwidth into several low speed channels (10 Gbits/s to 100 Gbits/s) and 
reaching a high total data rate by combing several channels. 
 There are two types of WDM:  
i) coarse wavelength division multiplexing (CWDM) [23], which uses a relatively small 
number of channels, four or eight, and a large channel spacing of 20 nm, and  
ii) dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM), which uses a large number of 
channels (40, 80, or 160), and a correspondingly small channel spacing of 12.5, 25, 50 or 
100 GHz.  
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2.5 Routing And Wavelength Assignment (RWA) 
 In optical networks, users communicate via end-to-end optical channels known as 
lightpaths [24]. A lightpath may traverse multiple fibre links in order to allow the 
communication between two nodes. Each lightpath is characterized by a route and a 
wavelength. When establishing a lightpath, two constraints should be respected: the 
wavelength continuity constraint and the wavelength clash constraint. The wavelength 
continuity constraint states that each lightpath must use the same wavelength on all the 
fiber links that it traverses. The wavelength clash constraint states that when two 
lightpaths share a common fiber link each should be assigned a different wavelength. The 
routing and wavelength assignment (RWA) [25] problem is to find a route over the 
physical topology and an available wavelength on the selected route, for each lightpath 
request. If no such route and wavelength can be found, then the connection request is 
blocked.  
 The RWA problem can be divided into two main categories based on the traffic 
model: static traffic and dynamic traffic. In the static RWA problem, all lightpath requests 
are known in advance, and the routing and wavelength assignment operations are 
performed off-line [9]. Different objectives can be used, e.g. to minimize the number of 
wavelengths used, or to maximize the number of connections that can be established. In 
the dynamic RWA problem, lightpath requests arrive randomly and resources are allocates 
on-demand [9]. Typically, the objective is to minimize the blocking probability [9].  
2.6 Fault Management in Optical Networks 
 
 In a WDM network, failure of a network element may cause failure of several 
optical channels leading to large data loss which can interrupt communication services. 
To deal with network element failure two main strategies can be used: protection and 
restoration [3]. In protection based approaches, backup resources of the network in 
advance are reserved in advance. In restoration based approaches, online spare backup 
resources are found and used after fault is detected. 
Protection techniques may be further classified as link protection or path protection [28]. 
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In the case of link protection, backup paths and wavelengths are reserved around each 
link on the primary path. These backups are used by all the connections traversing the 
failed link. In the case of path protection, for each connection a primary path and a 
backup path are reserved. In case of any failure on the primary path the connection will 
automatically switch to the backup path. 
There are two types of path-protections: dedicated path-protection and shared path-
protection.  
Protection Description 
dedicated path-protection  Allocate a dedicated backup path for each primary path 
shared path-protection sharing backup path resources among multiple primary paths 
 
2.6.1 Dedicated Path Protection (DPP) 
 Dedicated path protection is an end-to-end protection scheme used in network 
architectures to protect against inevitable failures of network that might affect the 
services offered to end customers 
Using dedicated path protection scheme, if a connection is to be established 
between node S and node D, two lightpaths should be allocated for this connection, a 
primary path and a backup path. In case of no failure, the primary path is used to transmit 
data. If a fault occurs along the primary path then the backup path is used. The two 
allocated paths (primary and backup) should have no common links (i.e. should be link 
disjoint) in order to prevent simultaneous failure of both paths. In case where the 
common resource fail then both paths will be discarded and the connection will not be 
established as consequence. 
 There are two techniques that could be considered while using dedicated path 
protection, 1+1 and 1:1. 
1+1 Technique: 
13 
 
  In 1+1 technique, data is transmitted simultaneously over both the primary and 
backup paths [26]. First, the data transmitted over the primary path is received by the last 
node. It gets checked and if any error is detected, then automatically the backup path is 
considered and checked. This technique is fast but it is bandwidth consuming. 
 
1:1 Technique: 
 The 1:1 technique is similar to the 1+1, but data is not transmitted on the backup 
path until a failure occurs. If a failure occurs on the primary path, the backup lightpath is 
established and is used to re-route the traffic. This technique is a little bit slower. 
  
2.6.2 Shared path protection (SPP) 
 The approach of shared path protection scheme is to share a backup channel 
among different primary paths. In other words, one backup channel can be used to protect 
various primary paths [26]. Using the shared path protection technique can help use the 
network resources in more efficient way. Although it is using the backup path concept, 
but it allows sharing of resources among multiple backup paths. A backup path is used 
whenever failure occurs along the corresponding primary path.  
2.7 Attacks in Optical Networks 
 Because of the high rate of data transmitted over transparent optical networks, any 
failure or intentional attack can have a serious influence on the amount of data that can be 
corrupted. Therefore security and attack management is becoming a very important issue. 
Transparency is an optical network feature that allows routing and switching of data 
without conversion or regeneration. This is one important reason that makes an attack 
have a serious impact on data in a transparent optical network. Transparency introduces 
significant changes to the security paradigm of optical networks by allowing signals to 
propagate through the network undetected. This creates a security vulnerability which can 
be used by attackers to degrade the network performance [27]. 
14 
 
 The damage caused by an attack is more dangerous and more difficult to prevent 
than link or node failure. A component failure can affect lightpaths using that component, 
while an attack can affect many users and many parts of the network. The transparent 
optical network components that are most vulnerable to attacks are: the fiber, the 
amplifier and the switch. The fiber attack caused by cutting or bending the fiber can also 
be considered as component failure because it can be either cut or bent [27]. However 
another type of attack called jamming attack [27], is caused by using a legitimate channel 
to insert a high powered signal. A jamming attack causes crosstalk (the high powered 
signal leaks into another signal) [27] in amplifiers and switches, which leads to 
degradation and service disruption.  
 Crosstalk is one of the most dangerous types of attacks because it does not affect 
only the attacked connection but it has the ability to change an attacked signal into a 
potential attacker. Two kinds of crosstalk have been considered in the literature: in-band 
crosstalk [27] and out-of-band crosstalk [27]. 
 
Attack Method Means 
In-Band Jamming Use high powered signal using same channel and 
share a common switch. 
Out-of-Band Jamming Use high powered signal using different channels 
and share a common link. 
 
2.7.1 In-band crosstalk: 
 An attack using in-band crosstalk can be achieved by injecting a high-power 
jamming signal (e.g., 20 dB higher than the other channels) on a legitimate lightpath, 
which can cause significant leakage inside the switches between lightpaths using the 
same wavelength as the attacker. The attacked signal may receive enough energy from 
the attacking signal through the crosstalk, which makes it a potential attacker for other 
signals. 
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Figure  2.5 represents the in-band crosstalk in a switch (intra channel crosstalk) 
and gain competition [5]: User1 and the attacker are using the same channel (λ1) and 
sharing a common switch. Since the power of the attacker signal is higher than the power 
of user1 signal, the attacker signal will leak into user1 signal (in-band crosstalk) and the 
gain competition is discussed in section 2.7.2. 
 
Figure ‎2-5 in-band crosstalk 
2.7.2 Out-of-band crosstalk 
 Amplifiers are one of the most important parts of optical WDM networks, they 
are used to restore the strength of optical signals that might be lost while the signals 
propagate through the network (attenuation). There are several different types of 
amplifiers available, such as Erbium-doped fiber amplifiers (EDFAs), 
Praseodymiumdoped fiber amplifiers (PDFAs), and semiconductor optical amplifiers 
(SOAs) [27].  
 EDFAs are the most commonly used; they are made of short optical fibers doped 
with the rare earth element erbium. Light from external semiconductor lasers is coupled 
into the fiber exciting the erbium atoms. Therefore, when optical signals enter the fiber, 
they stimulate the excited erbium atoms to emit photons at the same wavelength as the 
incoming signal [27] 
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 The amplifier has a limited number of photons which will be divided among users 
in proportion to their signal strength, this is known as gain competition. The attacker can 
use a high power signal, a high power jamming attack, to use the majority of the available 
photons which will reduce the gain of the weaker users.  
 Furthermore, long distances and high-power signals can introduce nonlinearities 
in the fiber causing interchannel crosstalk effects between signals on different 
wavelengths (out-of-band crosstalk).  Therefore, if a jamming signal is injected on a 
legitimate lightpath, it can disrupt the lightpath it is injected on and the other lightpaths 
with which it is sharing a common link, because of gain competition in amplifiers and 
interchannel crosstalk on fibers.  
 Figure 2.6 represents two signals sharing same fiber but using different channels. 
The signal using channel λ1 (attacker) has enough high power that affects the signal on 
channel λ2 (out-of-band crosstalk). 
 
Figure ‎2-6 shows interchannel crosstalk [5] 
2.8 Attack Group 
 Attack group (AG) is the set of lightpaths that can attack each other using high 
power jamming [5]. Attack group is the union of the link-share attack group and the in-
band attack group. 
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The link-share attack group of a lightpath p (LAGp) can be defined as the set of 
lightpaths, with which p shares at least one common link (or fiber). Based on this, the 
Lightpath Attack Radius (LAR) [5] of p is calculated as: LARp = | LAGp| + 1. In other 
words, LARp is the number of lightpaths (including itself), with which p shares at least 
one link.  
The in- band attack group of a lightpath p (IAGp) can be defined as the set of 
lightpaths which p can attack directly, using the same wavelength. All the lightpaths in 
the group, IAGp, use the same wavelength and share a common node with lightpath p. 
Based on this, the In-Band Attack Radius (IAR) of p is calculated as: IARp = | IAGp| + 1. 
Based on the above definitions, the attack group of a lightpath p is defined as:  
                               (2.1) 
2.9 Literature Review 
 In this section we review the existing literature for attack-aware RWA in optical 
networks. The first group of papers [7], [2], [8], [9], [4], [10] and [1] are all concerned 
with the prevention aspect of an attack to minimize its effect on the network. The second 
group of papers [3], [5] and [6] are concerned with the issue of path protection by 
choosing working paths and their backup paths in a way to protect the network. 
2.9.1. Preventive approach: 
 The problem that [7] addressed is to minimize the possible reachability of a 
jamming attack with respect to gain competition and inter-channel crosstalk. 
The authors proposed a tabu search algorithm (TS-JAR) for the routing subproblem to 
“minimize the Jamming Attack Radius, while accommodating all the lightpath demands 
and to minimize the upper bound on the number of wavelengths required for successful 
Wavelength Assignment (WA) and potentially reduce lightpath congestion”.  
 First they limit potential physical routes to the K-shortest paths between node 
pairs. Then, for the neighbouring solutions they construct the conflict graph CG(X) of the 
current solution X, where each node represents a lightpath and a link between two nodes 
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means that the lightpaths share a common physical link. The maximum degree of a 
conflict graph is the JAR of the routing scheme. They define the reduced neighborhood 
be the set of nodes in the conflict graph whose degree is: Degree (Lpi) ≤ α · JAR(X),  0 ≤ 
α ≤1. If the value of α is reduced, then the neighborhood size is enlarged to consider more 
potential solutions but this will influence the execution time of the algorithm. The authors 
claim that their tabu search heuristic algorithm helps to minimize the JAR, to find 
suboptimal solutions, and to minimize the upper bound on the number of wavelengths 
required for successful wavelength assignment and reduces congestion with respect to 
shortest path routing. 
 In [2], the authors consider physical layer attacks, especially intra-channel 
crosstalk attacks, which can seriously affect the service. This kind of attacks can reach 
connections not even sharing components with the attacking signal. The new idea 
proposed by the authors, in this paper, is a new objective for the WA problem: 
minimizing the maximal radius of intra-channel crosstalk attack propagation. They call 
this measure the Propagating Crosstalk Attack Radius (P-CAR), which is the maximum 
number of lightpaths one jamming signal can affect by propagating intra-channel 
crosstalk in switches. Reducing the P-CAR enables the authors to limit intra-channel 
crosstalk attacks, with minimum or no extra cost, by planning the network carefully. 
 In their model, the authors use fixed shortest path routing to assign physical routes 
to lightpath demands. Also they consider that a jamming signal can attack all lightpaths 
using the same wavelength and sharing the same switch only at intermediate nodes. 
 They model the attacking relations as Attack Graphs. Lightpaths routed on the 
same wavelength are represented by the nodes of a single attack graph. Each node has 
outgoing directed links to other nodes it can attack. The P-CAR of a given wavelength is 
the maximum out-degree of the attack graph of that wavelength, incremented by 1. The 
authors claim that their algorithms achieve significantly smaller attack damage and this is 
done with no extra resources. They also claim that considering only the upper bound on 
the P-CAR, when assigning wavelengths is precise enough, while it significantly reduces 
complexity.  
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 In [8], the authors addressed the problem of intra-channel crosstalk attacks in 
switches and the potential damage caused by such attacks. The authors propose a new 
objective function for the WA problem which is to minimize the Propagating Crosstalk 
Attack Radius (P-CAR). The Propagating Crosstalk Attack Radius is the maximum 
number of lightpaths a jamming signal injected on any legitimate data lightpath can 
attack via propagating intra-channel crosstalk in switches. 
 In order to concentrate on wavelength assignment, the authors used fixed shortest 
path routing. They used a layered graph approach, where each layer of the physical 
topology represents a different wavelength. They used the Best Fit P-CAR Wavelength 
Assignment algorithm that takes lightpaths in random order and routes them on the layer 
which yields the lowest P-CAR after accommodating the lightpath. The P-CAR on each 
layer is calculated by finding the attack graph corresponding to that wavelength using a 
recursive algorithm and then finding its maximum degree incremented by one.  They 
used the Best Fit Decreasing P-CAR Wavelength Assignment algorithm that sorts the 
lightpaths in decreasing order of their shortest paths and then proceeds as 
BF_PCAR_WA. They also used two additional approaches, First Fit Wavelength 
Assignment and First Fit Decreasing Wavelength Assignment) algorithms which place 
lightpaths on the first layers in random order or in decreasing order of their shortest paths. 
The authors claim that their proposed GRASP heuristics obtain significantly smaller PAR 
and SAR values in all test scenarios in comparison to FFD and the crosstalk-friendlier 
RP. 
 In [9], the authors tackle the problem of attacks that can influence data 
propagating the optical fibers of transparent networks. They mention the growing size of 
data exchanged among users of networks which reflected the possible size of damage that 
could cause an attack. The new idea that the authors propose is routing lightpaths in a 
way to limit the damage of an attack with no additional cost. The authors propose an ILP 
formulation and add a new objective criterion for the RWA problem; they call it the 
maximum Lightpath Attack Radius (maxLAR). Their objective is to minimize the 
maxLAR and accommodate all the demands in order to minimize the number of damaged 
lightpaths. This also can help in the detection, localization and recovery phases. They 
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also used a tabu search algorithm (TS-LAR) for large networks. The authors claim that 
the TS-LAR heuristic significantly outperformed all the other approaches with respect to 
the maxLAR. 
 In [4], the authors address the problem of vulnerability of transparent optical 
network to physical-layer attacks and the damage caused to the huge amount of data 
propagating the network. In this paper, the authors define a new objective criterion to 
evaluate the impact of jamming attacks in RWA, they call it the Maximum Attack Radius 
(maxAR). They calculate the Out-of-band Attack Radius (OAR)  and the In-band Attack 
Radius (IAR) of Lpi   in order to find the maxAR which is their sum + 1. They define the 
AR of a wavelength as the maximum AR over all lightpaths routed on that wavelength, 
and the AR of an RWA scheme as the maximum AR over all lightpaths. Then they 
propose a heuristic algorithm to minimize this new objective via wavelength assignment 
over the attack-aware routing approach. The authors claim that their proposed algorithm 
is able to not only limit the consequences of potential jamming attacks, but also 
minimizes the wavelength usage at the same time. 
 In [1], the authors addressed the problem of securing optical networks from high 
power jamming and tapping attacks which are considered as malicious attacks. In this 
paper, the authors present a new approach that jointly minimizes the effects of both in-
band and out-of-band attacks and solves the routing and wavelength assignment (RWA) 
problem dynamically. They developed an ILP formulation with objective to minimize the 
LAR and IAR values and the path length of the newly established lightpath in order to 
prevent loops in some areas of the network. They also propose a heuristic for dynamic 
RWA (SA-DWA) in which they find a set of possible routes over the physical topology 
for each source-destination pair. Using the previous information with the set of existing 
lightpaths already established over the network with their physical routes and assigned 
wavelengths, the heuristic calculates the set of available channels on a link and the set of 
available wavelengths on all edges of a particular route. The authors claim that the 
proposed approach for security-aware dynamic RWA can reduce the vulnerability of the 
lightpaths to potential attacks, at the cost of obtaining some high blocking probability, 
when compared to traditional RWA techniques.  
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2.9.2. Protection approach: 
 In [3], the authors addressed the survivability of optical networks facing jamming 
attacks using in-band crosstalk in switches. The authors propose a dedicated attack-aware 
backup path protection algorithm. It consists of separating the primary path and the 
backup path into different attack groups to ensure survivability of the network against 
jamming attacks in switches. In addition, by limiting the maximum number of lightpaths 
each lightpath can attack, the damage from in-band jamming attack will be limited. 
 They assume that an attack can be inserted anywhere along any primary path, or 
in case of a previous link failure, along an active backup path. To ensure survivability of 
connections under an attack they need to assign different wavelengths to the primary and 
backup path of every lightpath. 
 They proposed an algorithm which they call “Attack-Aware Dedicated Path 
Protection (AA-DPP) algorithm”. They compare the AA-DPP with a generic algorithm 
for dedicated path protection they call Dedicated Path Protection (DPP) aimed only at 
minimizing the number of wavelengths necessary for protection from single-link failures, 
without considering attacks. The authors claim that the AA-DPP algorithm obtains lower 
IAR and average IAR values than DPP in all scenarios, at the cost of some increase in the 
number of wavelengths, and AA-DPP achieves lower WLU and AHD values for backup 
paths than DPP in almost all test scenarios. 
 In [5], the authors addressed the problem of routing and wavelength assignment 
survivability. In this paper, the authors introduce the Attack Group (AG) of each 
lightpath and specify an exclusive backup path for each lightpath which cannot be 
attacked by the same attacker. AG of a lightpath LP is the set of lightpaths which can 
attack LP. A high-powered jamming signal can affect lightpaths using a common 
wavelength, i.e. in-band effect which they call AGi set, or using different wavelength 
than the attacker, i.e. out-of-band effect, which they call AGo set. So the AG of LP is the 
union set of AGi and AGo of that LP.  
 To ensure the protection, the working and the backup path must be AG-disjoint, 
which means that the intersection of AGs of the working and the backup path of each 
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connection is an empty set. To calculate the AG of a lightpath LP, they represent the 
relations among lightpaths by an attack graph, where nodes are lightpaths. If two 
lightpaths can affect each other their corresponding nodes are connected. The AGi of a 
lightpath are its neighbouring nodes using the same wavelength, and the AGo are the 
neighbouring nodes using different wavelengths.  The attack radius AR, an objective 
criterion used to minimize the damage caused by an attack, of LP equals the size of its 
AG, incremented by one.  
 The authors also introduce an algorithm that they call Attack-Survivable Routing 
and Wavelength Assignment (AS-RWA). To evaluate the AS-RWA algorithm, they 
compared it against a generic algorithm for Dedicated Path Protection (DPP) and the 
Attack-Survivable Wavelength Assignment (AS-WA) algorithm. The authors claim that 
their proposed approach can achieve enhanced connection security under high-power 
jamming attacks with efficient wavelength-link usage. 
 In [6], the authors state that conventional network survivability approaches 
protect transmission in case of component faults but do not provide good protection from 
jamming since the working and backup paths of a connection may both be affected by the 
same jamming signal. In this paper, the author extends their previous work [5] by adding 
a new approach for Jamming Aware Shared Path Protection (JA-SPP) to achieve 
survivability in the presence of jamming signals in a more resource-efficient way.  
 In JA-SPP, backup paths of two connections must not share resources if their 
working paths are both within reach of any common potential jamming signal which 
could affect them at the same time. They also considered that the working and the backup 
paths of each connection in JA-SPP must not share any physical link to protect from link 
failures. In addition, resource-sharing among backup paths whose respective working 
paths share common physical links is prohibited and the wavelength clash and continuity 
constraints must hold. The authors claim that JA-SPP protects from both single link 
failures and high-power jamming, while maintaining the same level of resource usage 
efficiency as standard single link failure SPP with no jamming-awareness. 
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Most of the previous work deals with the preventive approach in case of an attack, 
and in case of the protection approach either the in-band or the out-of-band attack for the 
static traffic model. One of the papers [5] considers both cases of an attack, but the 
approach proposes a very strict interpretation of when two lightpaths are not in each 
other’s link-share attack group, i.e. any two lightpaths sharing a common link are 
assumed to be capable of attacking each other, without taking into consideration that the 
power of a jamming signal decreases when the distance between the attacking lightpath 
and the attacked lightpath increases. 
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3 Proposed Solution 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, we discuss our proposed model for estimating the attack group of 
a lightpath. As mentioned in sec 2.8 the attack group of a lightpath p (AGp) represents the 
set of lightpaths that may be ‘attacked’ i.e. may experience significant loss of signal 
quality, by malicious actions on lightpath p. We note that inclusion in the attack group is 
a symmetric relationship. In other words, for two lightpaths p and q, if pAGq∈  then 
qAGp∈ . Based on the definition of attack group given in eqn 2.1, [5] defined a model 
for attack-aware survivable RWA in optical networks, which has been discussed in Sec. 
2.8. In this chapter, we first discuss our proposed model and highlight the differences 
between the two models, through a simple illustrative example. Then, we discuss our 
software application to evaluate the performance of our proposed model.   
 Because of the huge amount of data transmitted over the optical networks, there 
might be a significant number of lightpaths that share common switches. If two of the 
lightpaths, sharing a switch, are using the same channel then there might be a crosstalk 
(leakage of one signal into the other) between the two lightpaths. An attacker can exploit 
this type of crosstalk to influence signals of other users. In addition, there might be 
crosstalk among lightpaths that are not using the same channel, but which are sharing one 
or more fiber links. Signals using different channels may interfere with neighbouring 
channels. Typically the amount of interference decreases as channel separation increases. 
 
3.2 Proposed model 
 Our proposed model uses the same definition for in-band attack group of a 
lightpath p as given in Sec. 2.8 which is given below. 
 IAGp =  | IAGp| + 1                                                     (3.1) 
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However the definition of the lightpath attack group is modified as follows. 
  )|≤-(|∧        : ikkpwithlinkcommononeleastatsharesqq=LAG qpip,    (3.2) 
 Here kp and kq represent the channel assigned to lightpath p and q respectively, 
and i represents the channel separation of the two lightpaths, in terms of the channel 
numbers. So, in the proposed models, a lightpath p that shares a common link with 
lightpath q, may not necessarily belong to the attack group of q. Whether or not 
qAGp∈  depends of the channel spacing between the two lightpaths. It is well known 
that the interference and crosstalk between two lightpaths sharing a common link 
decreases as the channel spacing between their assigned channels increases [11]. The 
actual value of channel spacing for which the crosstalk may be ignored depends on a 
number of factors, such as the signal strength of the attacking and attacked signals, the 
type of modulation used and the properties of the fiber. Therefore, our model provides a 
flexible definition of the attack group, where the value of i can be varied depending on 
the signal characteristics and fiber properties. In our simulations, we have used i=1 or 
i=2, i.e., an attacking signal can affect only the adjacent channels or second adjacent 
channels. The model used in [5] can be considered a special case of our model, where i= 
|K| and K is the set of available channels on a fiber link. When considering path 
protection, we use the same conditions identified in the previous section. 
 
Fig. 3.1 shows a fiber with 8 available channels, numbered 0 – 7. If an attacking 
signal is introduced on channel 3, it will attack lightpaths on adjacent channels only (i.e. 
channel 2 and channel 4), if i=1 in eqn (3.2). If i=2, then in addition to the adjacent 
channels, the attacking signal can also disrupt lightpaths on the second-adjacent channels 
(i.e. channel 1 and channel 5). However, signals on channels 0, 6 and 7 will not be 
affected by this attack. 
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Figure ‎3-1 first and second adjacent channels 
3.3 Attack Aware RWA with DPP  
When using DPP, two lightpaths must be set up for each connection request p 
between a pair of source and destination nodes; one is called working or primary 
lightpath and the other is called backup lightpath. We will identify the working and 
backup lightpaths, for a connection p, as wp  and bp  respectively. The backup lightpath 
is not used unless the primary lightpath is disrupted, either due to a fault in the network or 
an attack. The primary and backup lightpaths of a connection must be both link and node 
disjoint.  If this condition is not satisfied any attack on a common node or link may 
potentially be able to disrupt both the primary and the backup lightpaths simultaneously. 
If this happens, the connection will not be able to survive the attack. 
When considering the RWA problem with DPP, for each new connection request p, we 
check if  
1) Both the primary and backup lightpaths can be attacked simultaneously by any 
primary lightpath or any backup lightpath of an existing connection q. In other 
words (
w
qw AGp ∈  and 
w
qb AGp ∈  ) or  (
b
qw AGp ∈  and 
b
qb AGp ∈ ) 
Attacking signal 
First adjacent 
First adjacent 
Second adjacent 
Second adjacent 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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2) Moreover, we check if any of the primary or backup lightpaths of the new 
connection can simultaneously attack both the primary and backup lighpaths of 
any existing connection q. In other words ( 
w
pw AGq ∈  and bpw AGq ∈  ) or  
(
w
pb AGq ∈  and 
b
pb AGq ∈ ) 
If either of the above conditions is true, then the corresponding route and wavelength 
assignment should not be allowed for the new request. 
 This is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Here p1w and p1b are the primary and backup 
lightpaths for a connection request from node 1 to node 6. Similarly, p2w and p2b are the 
primary and backup lightpaths for a second connection request from node 2 to node 3. In 
this example p1w and p1b are node and link disjoint. However, both of them are 
vulnerable to an attack through the backup lightpath p2b for connection 2. Lightpath p2b 
uses channel λ1 and can attack lightpath p1w, which uses channel λ2, since they share a 
common link 34. Also, p2b can attack lightpath p1b using channel λ1, due to in-band 
crosstalk at node 2 and node 3. On the other hand, if we assign wavelength λ4 for 
lightpath p1w, then based on eqn (3.1), with i=2, p2b can no longer attack p1w and this 
would be a valid RWA. 
 
Figure ‎3-2 Illustration for working and backup lightpaths vulnerable to attacks by a common lightpath 
λ1 
λ2 
λ3 
λ4 
p2w 
p2b 
p1b 
p1w 
1 
2 
4 
3 
5 
6 
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3.4 Illustrative Example 
In this section we use a simple illustrative example to show how to determine the 
attack groups for different lightpaths and calculate maximum attack radius for a 
given RWA, using our model as well as the attack-aware dedicated path protection 
(AA-DPP) model in [5]. We consider the network of Fig. 3.3, consisting of 6 nodes 
network, 9 bidirectional links, where each optical fiber has 4 wavelengths: λ1, λ2, 
λ3 and λ4. Three connections have been established over the network, each with a 
primary and a backup lightpath.  The RWA for the set of lightpaths is given in 
Table 3.1. To differentiate between the primary lightpath and backup lightpath of a 
connection, we use solid lines and dashed, respectively.  
 
Table ‎3-1 Used channels and Connections of Fig. 3.3 
 Connection 1 Connection 2 Connection 3 
Primary route 1456 23 12 
Backup route 1236 2453 142 
Primary channel λ4 λ3 λ4 
Backup channel λ1 λ1 λ2 
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Figure ‎3-3 lightpaths of three connections 
 As an example, we will calculate the in-band attack group (AGi) and out-of-band 
attack group (AGo) for lightpath p1w, the primary lightpath for connection 1. For all three 
approaches, the in-band attack group of p1w includes only lightpath p3w, since p1w is the 
only other lightpath using channel λ4 and it shares a common node (node 1) with p1w. 
For out-of-band attack group, the results will be different for each approach. Using AA-
DPP, both p2b and p3b are included in the attack group, since p2b (p3b) shares link 45 
(14) with p1w. Using our proposed approach, with i=1, no other lightpath will be 
included in the out-of-band attack group of p1w. This is because, although both p2b and 
p3b share a common link with p1w, neither one uses an adjacent channel. Finally, using 
our proposed approach with i=2, only p3b will be included in the attack group, since it 
uses the second-adjacent channel λ2.  
In a similar fashion, the in-band and out-of-band attack groups for all the lightpaths are 
calculated and shown in Table 3.2 
  
 
 
λ1 
λ2 
λ3 
λ4 
p2w 
 
p2b 
 
p1b 
p1w 
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Table ‎3-2 Attack Groups of Fig 3.3 Using AA-DPP and the Proposed Approach 
Lightpat
hs 
AGi 
(same for 
all cases) 
AGo Total Attack Radius 
(|AGi|+|AGo|) 
AA-
DPP[*] 
Proposed AA-
DPP[*] 
Proposed 
   i = 1 i = 2  i = 1 i = 2  
p1w p3w p2b , p3b  p3b 3 1 2 
p1b p2b p2w , p3w  p2w 3 1 2 
p2w  p1b  p1b 1 0 1 
p2b p1b p1w   2 1 1 
p3w p1w p1b   2 1 1 
p3b  p1w  p1w 1 0 1 
 
3.5 Experiments Steps 
A primary objective of this research is to investigate the cost of security-aware 
RWA algorithms. The authors in [5] did not study the overhead associated with the 
approach they proposed.  In a network where each fiber may support up to 32 channels, if 
one channel is used by a lightpath L, all the remaining 31 channels will be considered to 
be under attack, so that up to 32 primary/backup paths will need to be taken into account. 
For all these 32 lightpaths the routing algorithm must ensure that lightpath L does not 
attack the corresponding backup/primary lightpaths. In other words, after lightpath L is 
established, the presence of this path imposes significant restrictions on the paths/ 
channel numbers that may be used by subsequent connections. The net effect is that some 
of the connections which could be established if this threat due to lightpath L did not 
exist, will no longer be allowed. The lightpath L therefore not only uses one channel on 
each fiber in its path it blocks additional resources of the network and, in effect, increases 
the cost of the network. 
  One of our objectives is to study the effect of AA-DPP approach on the cost of the 
network. In addition, we are going to study our approach which simplifies the attack 
model by making some constraints less strict which will affect the attack radius. 
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 Our approach is that the influence of an attacking signal will create less 
impairment to channels which are not adjacent to the channel used by the attacking 
signal. The theoretical foundations of this approach are being studied by another graduate 
student in our group. In our simplified model we are considering that the effect of an 
attacking signal will be most harmful to  the signals using  adjacent channels and the 
second adjacent channels and not very significant to other channels. The other graduate 
student has established that this does not affect the quality of the solution. 
 In our experiments, we are going to study the effect of 
 AA-DPP approach on the network performance, 
 Our simplified model on the performance of the network.  
This comparative study will be based on the blocking probability of connections in the 
network. The blocking probability is calculated using the number of blocked requests 
divided by the total number of requests. Our approach is that, for a given set of resources 
in a network, if the adoption of strategy S1, the blocking probability is less than the 
blocking probability if   strategy S2,  it means that strategy S1 allows us to handle more 
requests than strategy S2 and the operational expenses (OPEX)  using strategy S1 is 
lower.  
We are going to compare the results of 4 models:  
 AA-DPP model,  
 our model using the first adjacent channel as the source of security threat,  
 our model with the first and the second adjacent channel as the sources of security 
threat, and  
 the dedicated path protection model, where security threats are not taken into 
account. 
In order to be consistent while running the tests, we are going to use same network 
topology and the same set of requests with the four models. 
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3.6 Our Model 
 
 
      
 
Since there are less than 10 existing wide-area optical networks, we have 
generated synthetic networks with different sizes to test our algorithm. Our work may be 
divided into two main phases: a pre-processing phase and an online phase. 
Start 
End 
Read network topology 
Build the network 
state 
Get Statistics 
Calculate Statistics 
Read path pairs database 
Read pairs of nodes database 
 
Generate path pairs 
database 
Start 
End 
Read network topology 
Generate pairs of 
nodes database 
Figure ‎3-5 Pre-processing phase         Figure ‎3-4 Online phase 
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3.6.1 Pre-Processing Phase 
Because searching for a route to assign to a lightpath is time consuming, we pre-
computed, in advance, a certain number of alternative routes for each pair of nodes in the 
network. So whenever we have to process a request for communication, we need not 
waste time on searching for a route, we just looked up some promising paths from the 
pre-computed set of paths and use it. 
 The pre-processing phase consists of the following: 
1. Read the topology of the network from an input file into a two dimensional table. 
2. Generate some pairs of primary and backup edge disjoint lightpaths for each pair of 
nodes. These pairs of lightpaths will be used in the online phase to establish a new 
request between the two corresponding nodes. We are using the First-Fit approach in 
order to specify which combination of primary-backup lightpaths to be used. If none of 
the generated combinations works then the request will be considered as blocked request. 
3. Generating a sequence of random pairs of numbers between 0 and N (where N is the 
number of nodes in the network) and saved into a file to be used during the online phase. 
These pairs of numbers represent the source and destination nodes of requests. 
3.6.2 Reading Network Topology 
 Our algorithm starts by reading the data that defines the network topology, 
specifying the nodes and the links, from a text file. The data is supplied in the form of a 
two dimensional table of size NxN, where N is the number of nodes in the network. The 
following example illustrates the representation of a network topology. 
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Figure ‎3-6 Example of reading network topology 
 
 Each edge connecting two nodes represents a bidirectional fiber link, which 
means that data can be transmitted in both directions. For instance, node 0 is linked to 
node 1 with an edge, meaning that data can be sent from node 0 to node 1 and from node 
1 to node 0. In the table, if the value in row i and column j is 1(0), it means there is a link 
(there is no link) between node i and node j. 
Number the edges of the bidirectional links. The following figure gives a simple example 
about numbering the edges. 
 
Figure ‎3-7 Example of numbering the edges 
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3.6.3 Generate Database of edge-disjoint paths 
 After reading the network topology, we generated a database of potential paths 
that may be used to handle connection. For each pair of nodes (i, j) in the network, we 
have generated m pairs of edge disjoint paths between i and j, for some predetermined 
value of m (we used m = 9). In dedicated path protection approach, each connection 
involves identifying two paths which do not have any common edge. One of these paths 
is called the primary path, which is used to transmit the data in the absence of 
“problems”. Here the problem could be an edge failure or a security threat on any edge or 
node in the path. When such a problem occurs, communication will switch from the 
primary path to the back-up path.  Since the backup path does not share any link with the 
primary path, we have to ensure that both paths cannot be attacked simultaneously. Our 
database contains m pairs of edge-disjoint paths. At the time of establishing a connection 
from, say, node s to node d, one of these m pairs of paths will be used. We will designate 
one of the paths in the selected pair as the primary path and the other as the backup path.  
 To find the edge disjoint paths, we have implemented Yen's Algorithm to first find 
k shortest paths between each pair of nodes in the network, where k is a predetermined 
number (we used k = 3). Those k paths are used as the primary paths. For each of the 
primary paths, we deleted, from the network, the edges that appear in the path and found 
k shortest paths again. These resulting paths are used as the backup paths. We therefore 
get a total of  m = k
2
 pairs of paths. Each set of pairs of paths between the two nodes is 
saved in our database. We have used this database when establishing a connection for a 
new request. 
The following figure represents a simplified example of generated combinations of 
primary-backup lightpaths for the pair of nodes (0,4). 
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Figure ‎3-8 Example of generated primary-backup lightpaths 
 
 In this example, P1 represents a primary path from node 0 to node 4, B1,1 and 
B1,2 represent its corresponding backup paths. P2 represents another primary path, B2,1 
and B2,2 its corresponding backups. Since we are using the dedicated path protection 
approach, the primary path and its backups should be edge disjoint. 
 The combinations can be as follows: 
   (P1;B1,1)  ,  (P1;B1,2)  ,  (P2;B2,1)  ,  (P2;B2,2). 
If the first combination cannot be established then the next will be checked and so 
on, until we find the first acceptable combination of paths, based on the corresponding 
attack model, that is going to be used. If none of the combinations is acceptable then the 
request from node 0 to node 4 is going to be blocked and another request is considered. 
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3.6.4 Online Phase 
 
3.6.4.1 Setting up the network state 
 In order to study the blocking probability of a network in a realistic manner, this 
network should be carrying a certain amount of traffic when a new request for 
communication is considered. The amount of traffic is critically important in such 
studies. If the network has relatively few existing connections, it is most likely that the 
new connection can be handled and the resulting blocking probability will be low. If the 
network is already handling too many connections, it is very likely that the new 
connection cannot be handled and the corresponding blocking probability will be high.  
 
All working connections should respect the dedicated path protection approach 
and the attack model to be tested. To build the network state, we have created a file, used 
as an input file to help build the network state, with randomly chosen pairs of nodes (s, d) 
from the network, each pair representing the source node s and destination node d of a 
request for connection. Our program read, from the input file, node pairs (s, d), and 
attempted to establish a connection from the source node s to the destination node d. If 
the connection can be established, then it is saved as working connection and we moved 
to the next pair of nodes in the input file.  If the connection cannot be established, then 
we just move to the next pair of nodes and we keep repeating this until we reach the 
desired number of working connections in the network. 
 To check if a connection can be established, we have followed the algorithm 3.1. 
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Algorithm 3.1Check_Connection Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 Check_Connection 
Input: New Request: R = (s,d), Network Topology, Pairs Of Paths Database , Network 
state, edges_channels table ( shows the used and unused channels of each edge in the 
network) 
Output: returns 1 if the connection can be established or 0 if the connection cannot be 
established. 
1. edge_disjoint_paths ← find_edge_disjoint_paths(s, d, Pairs_Of_Paths_Database) 
2. If EMPTY (edge_disjoint_paths) then 
3.     Return 0      // there is no pair of edge disjoint paths to establish the connection 
4. Else 
5.    For each  path_pair  edge_disjoint_paths 
6.          P ← primary_ path 
7.         b ← backup_ path 
8.         P_free_channels ← find_free_channels(p) 
9.         b_free_channels ← find_free_channels(b) 
10.         if NOT_EMPTY(P_free_channels) AND NOT_EMPTY(b_free_channels) then 
11.             for each p_channel  p_free_channels  
12.                   for each b_channel b_free_channels 
13.                         for each connection  Network_State 
14.                               if attack( p, connection_p) and attack( p, connection_b) then 
15.                                   OR ( b, connection_p) and attack( b, connection_b) 
16.                                    OR ( connection_p, p) and attack(  connection_p, b) 
17.                                     OR ( connection_b, p) and attack(  connection_b, b) 
18.                                  Break 
19.                               End if 
20.                         End for 
21.                         If connection == NULL then 
22.                             Return 1  // the new  connection is neither attacking nor attacked 
23.                         End if 
24.                      End for 
25.                End for 
26.           End if  
27.      End for 
28.      Return 0 // all pairs of paths are scanned and the connection cannot be 
established 
29.   End if 
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We have to find a viable path pair to handle the request for connection, say from s to d. 
For a pair of edge disjoint primary-backup connection to be acceptable, i) it should not 
attack any existing connection and ii) no existing connection should attack the new 
connection. This means that  
 both the primary and the backup lightpaths to handle the new request should not 
be attacked simultaneously by the primary or backup lightpath of any existing 
connection  
 the primary or the backup lightpath of the new request should not attack 
simultaneously the primary and backup lightpaths of an existing connection,  
 For the in-band attack which occurs in a switch for instance, two lightpaths should 
not use the same channel if they share a common switch. For the out-of -band attack that 
occurs in a common link, the two lightpaths should use different channels where the 
permitted difference between the channel numbers is determined by the attack model we 
are using. For instance, if we consider that adjacent and second adjacent channels may 
attack each other, then, if the first lightpath is using channel (c) the second lightpath 
should use channel c1 (where |c – c1| ≥3), in order not to attack each other. 
 So while establishing a new connection, channels should be assigned to the 
primary and backup lightpaths in a way to avoid both in-band and out-of-band attacks. 
The database of primary-backup paths created in the pre-processing phase, gives 
pairs of edge disjoint primary and backup paths from s to d. We checked each path pair, 
until we either found an acceptable path pair or we determined that no path pairs in the 
database satisfied our conditions.  If we succeed in finding a path pair from s to d and 
channel allocations, we saved the information and a working connection in the network 
state. If, after checking all the corresponding primary-backup pairs, we could not find an 
acceptable pair, then this connection cannot be established and we have to move on to 
another request. 
 After reaching the desired load on the network, we start studying the cases where 
new request for connection arrives, say from node s to node d. We check whether the new 
request can be accommodated by making provisions for a primary path and a backup path 
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both from s to d, satisfying the requirements of the attack model we are studying. If the 
new request cannot be accommodated, the request is blocked. We considered all possible 
node pairs (s, d) and calculated the blocking probability of the network by the ratio of the 
number of all the blocked calls to the total number of node pairs. A network with a low 
blocking probability means that it can handle more requests, which indicates that the 
performance of the network is better than a network with a higher blocking probability. 
This approach allows us compare the model proposed by [5] and our model. 
The same approach that we used to build the network state will be used to process 
each new request for communication in the online phase. The only difference is that we 
just update the statistics that will be used to calculate the blocking probability. 
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4 Results 
 
In optical networks using dynamic traffic RWA, the network performance is 
measured in terms of a metric called lightpath blocking probability [4], defined as the 
ratio of the number of lightpath requests that could not be accommodated (i.e., are 
blocked) to the total number of lightpath requests. An increase in number of set up 
requests means a decrease in the lightpath blocking probability, therefore a better 
network performance.  
 In this chapter we report the results of our simulations used  to evaluate the 
performance of our proposed approach and compare the results with those obtained using 
AA-DPP [5]  approach.. The simulations have been run using both real (NSFNET 14-
node topology) and synthetic (20-node and 40-node) network topologies.  For the 
synthetic networks, 5 different topologies were generated for each size considered. A link 
between two nodes in the physical network is assumed to be composed of 2 separate uni-
directional optical fibers, where each fiber supports either 8,16 or 32 channels. Traffic 
load values between 20 existing connections (low traffic) to 105 existing connections 
(high traffic) were used in the simulations. For each of these traffic load values, 5 
different sequences of connection requests were generated. As a result, for synthetic 
networks each blocking probability reported in this section is the average of 25 
simulation runs. For each traffic load, we first initialized the network by setting up the 
required number of ongoing connections. Then we tried to establish new connections, 
with different source-destination nodes, on top of the existing traffic load. 
4.1  Blocking probability vs. Demand size 
 Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show how the blocking probability changes when the 
traffic load is varied, for 16 channels per fiber. The Attack-Unaware DPP (AU-DPPP) 
represents the traditional DPP algorithm, which does not consider potential attacks. In 
AU-DPP, a connection is never blocked due to vulnerability to attacking lightpaths; it can 
only be blocked due unavailability of suitable channels to route the corresponding 
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working and backup lightpaths, due to network congestion. Therefore, in all these 
simulations, we expect that the AU-DPP approach will have the best performance, and is 
included as a reference point to evaluate the remaining approaches. As expected, the 
blocking probability in general increases with the traffic load. 
Table ‎4-1 Shows The Blocking Probability vs. Demand Size-14 nodes, 16 channels 
 Blocking Probability (%) 
Traffic Load 20 25 30 35 
Approach     
AA-DPP[5] 17.49 17.49 19.93 23.27 
Proposed (i=1) 7.25 7.25 8.66 15.38 
Proposed (i=2) 7.25 7.25 8.00 16.40 
Attack-Unaware DPP (AU-DPP) 7.25 7.25 7.25 11.78 
 
 Table 4.1 depicts that the blocking probability of AA-DPP [5] approach is higher 
than our approach and the simple dedicated path protection approach in all considered 
traffic demands load. Table 4.1 shows that the average blocking probability of  AA-DPP 
network is 17.49%  with 20, and 25 existing connections, while for our approach, the 
blocking probability is similar to AU-DPP at 7.25%  for the. As the traffic load increases, 
the difference in blocking probability between AU-DPP and the proposed approach 
becomes more noticeable. However, the proposed approach still consistently performs 
better that AA-DPP. 
Table ‎4-2 Shows The Blocking Probability vs. Demand Size-20 nodes, 16 channels 
 Blocking Probability (%) 
Traffic Load 20 25 30 35 
Approach     
AA-DPP 16.94 16.94 19.15 27.44 
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Proposed (i=1) 10.74 10.74 13.80 18.99 
Proposed (i=2) 10.74 10.74 13.77 18.69 
attack-unaware DPP 10.74 10.74 11.17 15.24 
 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 display the average blocking probabilities for networks of 20 
nodes and 40 nodes respectively, with fibers of 16 channels. The traffic load varied 
between 20 to 35 connections (90 to 105 connections). The results follow a similar 
pattern as for the 14-node case in general.  
Table ‎4-3 Shows The Blocking Probability vs. Demand Size-40 nodes, 16 channels 
 Blocking Probability (%) 
Traffic Load 90 95 100 105 
Approach     
AA-DPP 6.50 9.89 16.04 21.20 
Proposed (i=1) 6.39 9.53 15.70 23.58 
Proposed (i=2) 6.22 8.82 14.67 21.94 
AU-DPP 4.84 7.50 13.81 19.27 
 
Fig. 4.1 shows that in all cases where different traffic loads have been used, the blocking 
probability of our proposed approach is less than the blocking probability of AA-DPP. 
 
Figure ‎4-1 Comparison of blocking probabilities using different approaches 
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4.2  Blocking probability vs. Channels 
 In this section, we study how the blocking probability varies with the number of 
available channels per fiber. Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 represent the blocking probability of 
14-nodes, 20-nodes and 40 nodes network respectively using fibers with 8, 16 and 32 
channels. The three tables show that the blocking probability of AA-DPP consistently 
exceeds all the other approaches. The performance of our proposed approach is very 
close to that of AU-DPP, particularly when the network is less congested (i.e. more 
available channels per fiber). As the network congestion increases, the performance of 
the proposed approach degrades somewhat compared to AU-DPP, but is still better than 
AA-DPP. 
Table ‎4-4 14-nodes network with 20 demands 
 Blocking Probability 
Channels per fiber 8 16 32 
Approach    
AA-DPP 62.55 17.49 17.49 
Proposed (i=1) 57.78 7.25 7.25 
Proposed (i=2) 58.37 7.25 7.25 
AU-DPP 42.24 7.25 7.25 
 
 Table 4.4 shows that the blocking probability decreases when the number of 
channels per fiber increases from 8 channels per fiber to 16 channels per fiber and then 
remains constant when the number of channels increases from 16 to 32 per fiber.  
Table ‎4-5 20-nodes network with 20 demands 
 Blocking Probability 
Channels per fiber 8 16 32 
Approach    
AA-DPP 59.75 16.94 16.94 
Proposed (i=1) 55.58 10.74 10.74 
Proposed (i=2) 55.29 10.74 10.74 
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AU-DPP 45.00 10.74 10.74 
 
 
 
Table ‎4-6 40-nodes network with 90 demands 
 Blocking Probability 
Channels per fiber 8 16 32 
Approach    
AA-DPP 99.33 6.50 0.35 
Proposed (i=1) 99.31 6.39 0.33 
Proposed (i=2) 99.31 6.22 0.33 
AU-DPP 99.09 4.84 0.33 
 
 
Figure ‎4-2 Comparison of blocking probabilities with different number of channels 
Fig. 4.2 shows that the blocking probability of the AA-DPP approach exceeds the 
blocking probability of the proposed approached tested with different number of channels 
per fiber. 
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5 Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have developed a novel heuristic attack-aware RWA with 
dynamic traffic load in WDM networks. In the heuristic, we have used the dedication 
path protection scheme to secure the transmission of data in case an attack occurs in 
any part of the network. 
 To test the heuristic, we have used existing network topologies and generated 
synthetic network topologies as well. We have used different sizes of networks (14, 
20, and 40 nodes) and different number of channels per fiber for each network size. 
 The heuristic studies the blocking probability for each network considering under 
different traffic loads and with different number of channels per fiber, We considered 
two attack models: i) where the attacking signal can affect the first adjacent channel 
only and     ii) where it can affect the both the first and second adjacent channels as 
described in Section 3.2. 
 We have compared our results to the results in [5], where the attacking signal can 
affect all the channels of the fiber. We found that the blocking probability of our 
proposed heuristic is lower than the blocking probability of the approach used in [5].  
5.2 Future Work 
For future work, we may consider studying the performance of the WDM 
networks using the shared path protection approach, which typically leads to better 
utilization of available resources. Another future work may be to develop an optimal 
ILP formulation, which can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of 
different heuristics. 
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